Introduction 1
Many prey animals in terrestrial and aquatic environments have defences, such as spines, 2 stings, toxins and sticky secretions, that come into play after a predator has singled out a 3 particular prey individual for attack; these are often called secondary defences (Edmunds, 4 1974; Whitman, Blum & Alsop, 1990) . The level of secondary defences often differs 5 between individuals in the same prey population (review in Ruxton, Sherratt & Speed, 6 2004). For example, in some populations a fraction of the prey may lack defences 7 altogether (Brower, Pough & Meck, 1970) ; whilst in other populations all individuals are 8 defended to some extent but there may be considerable variation between individuals in the 9 levels of this defence, and perhaps the precise types of toxins present (Bowers, 1992; 10 Holloway et al., 1991) . Though well known, the existence of intraspecific variation in 11 secondary defences has received remarkably little attention from evolutionary biologists. 12
Instead much greater attention has been given to the evolution of signalling traits 13 associated with secondary defences, particularly aposematism and mimicry. 14 15 This neglect is misplaced, since, for example, understanding of the evolutionary dynamics 16 of secondary defences should be an essential prerequisite for consideration of signals of 17 those defences. Although optimisation theory has been applied to the study of inducible 18 secondary defences (e.g. Adler & Karban, 1994; Clark & Harvell, 1992; Frank, 1993; e.g. 19 Tollrian, 1999) , it has rarely been used to examine the evolutionary stability of defences 20 that are expressed permanently. The most important and influential theoretical work on the 21 evolution of such constitutive defences is that of Leimar et al. (1986) , which considered 22 level of defence to be a continuous trait, in that the level of a given defence could take an 23 infinite number of values varying smoothly over a defined range. Thus level of defence 24 could be well described in the model by a variable taking real number values. Leimar et al. 25 (1986) provide quantitative arguments that indicate that any ESS in their model will always 26 be a pure strategy. That is, at ESS all members of the population will invest equally in 27 defence. 28
29
In contrast, Guildford (1988; 1994) and Ruxton et al. (2004) suggest that the ESS would be 30 different when costly traits that enhance survival are discontinuous in their expression (i.e. 31 they can take on only a number of discrete values). Specifically, they suggest that in this 32 case the evolution of defence may be characterised by mixed ESSs where conspecifics with 33 different levels of defence co-exist at evolutionarily stable frequencies with equal fitness. 34 This conjecture is supported by the quantitative modelling of Till-Bottraud & Gouyon 1 (1992) and Speed et al. (2005) . Hence, there is a body of work which cumulatively 2 suggests that the nature of the variation in defence shown by a population should be 3 fundamentally different depending on whether the defence can be expressed across a 4 continuous range of values or only in a discrete set of levels. This presents both a practical 5 and philosophical challenge, since definitive classification of a defence as discrete or 6 continuous is difficult, not least since the expression of traits is a function of both an 7 organism's genotype (and gene changes are discrete actions) and the environment 8 (generally categorised as continuously variable). Hence this paper sets out to achieve three 9 main objectives: 10 11 1) To develop a quantitative model that we can use to test the conjecture of Leimar et 12 al. (1986) that the ESS in terms of level of defence should be expected to be a pure 13 strategy when defence is expressed as a continuous trait. 
The model framework 24
We restrict our analysis to "invisible" defences that can not be evaluated prior to an attack. 25
Specifically this means internally-stored chemical defences (toxins, secretions etc.) rather 26 than physical defences such as spines. We consider a simple population with discrete 27 generations and asexual reproduction. At the start of each generation, there are N 28 individuals, which must survive for a time T before reproducing. Each individual i is 29 characterised by its defence level D i . Level of defence influences survivorship in two ways. 30
Firstly, if an individual is attacked by a predator, then its probability of surviving that 31 attack increases with increased investment in defence. Specifically, if individual i is 32 attacked, then its probability of surviving that attack is given by 33
1 2 for some positive constant s. Secondly, we assume that predators must invest more time in 3 attacking more highly defended individuals. This can be thought of as the time taken to 4 overcome physical defences such as spines or a tough integument, or the time taken to 5 recover from ingesting chemical toxins (this is a common assumption in models of 6 defences and mimicry: e.g. Augner & Bernays, 1998; Brower et al., 1970; Huheey, 1964; 7 this is a common assumption in models of defences and mimicry: e.g. Pough et al., 1973) . 8
Whatever its physiological basis, we use this mechanism to define defence level. 9
Specifically D i is the time that a predator would have to invest in attacking individual i; 10 during this time it is unable to simultaneously seek further prey to attack. The consequence 11 of this mechanism is that the number of attacks that the prey population faces during a 12 generation (A) will be a declining function of investment in defence by that population. 13
The probability that individual i survives to reproduce at the end of the generation is 14 21 22 Although we require this assumption to provide analytic tractability, it should be noted that 23 from the simulations later in the paper we see that the key predictions of the analytic model 24 developed here are robust against violation of the assumption of light predation pressure. 25
We assume that investment in defence is costly, and that this cost is paid in reduced 26 fecundity of individuals that survive to the end of the generation. Hence, if individual i 27 survives to reproduce, its fecundity is simply 28 
Which for our chosen functional form reduces to 4 (N) is sufficiently large that the overall number of attacks on the population (A) is 10 negligibly affected by the specific D value selected by any one individual, then we can 11 consider that A is effectively independent of D i and so 12 
Since, to be biologically plausible we demand that D o is non-negative, we can see that we 24 find a unique and allowable D o providing we satisfy the condition 25 function of this population mixture, which we shall write as
We want a condition for the fitness of individuals with investment d a to be greater than 10 those with fitness d b . Using (6) and defining 11 13 14 it is easy to show that this condition is 15
18
Now G is independent of p, whereas A always increases with increasing p. Hence there is 19 either a single critical value of p (p*) at which the two types have equal fitness, or one type 20 always has higher fitness than the other, regardless of the value of p. That is, we would 21 expect the d a individuals to have higher fitness (and so increase as a proportion of the 22 
It is clear from inspection of (6) (and the derivative in 7) that if we look at fitness as a 4 function of investment in defence, this function has at most one turning point, which is a 5 maximum. Thus if any pair of defence levels are in equilibrium of the type described by 6 (17), then every (allowable) defence level between those two levels could invade the 7 population, but no defence values outside their range could. From this, a number of 8 consequences emerge 9 10 i) no collection of three or more defence levels can co-exist as an ESS; 11 ii) no pair of non-adjacent defence levels can form an ESS; 12 iii) any pair of adjacent levels that are in equilibrium, ie. that satisfy (eqn. 17), form 13 an ESS at the critical mixture value p=p*; 14 iv)
there will be at most one pairwise ESS, where the adjacent pair of allowable 15 levels span the predicted pure ESS level of defence if defence were continuous 16 
From consideration of (17) and (18) 
Since the chain of As is always decreasing with increasing investment in defence (eqn. 19) 11 and the chain of Gs is always increasing (eqn. 20), then it is clear that (17) or (18) can be 12 satisfied at most once, and so there can only ever be at most one ESS. If the chains cross, 13 then the ESS can be pure or mixed, depending on whichever of (17) or (18) If at the end of a generation there are M individuals surviving, then these will be the 2 parents of the N individuals that will begin the next generation. For each of these N 3 individuals a parent is selected randomly (with replacement). The probability that a 4 particular individual is selected is weighted by its fecundity (which is a decreasing function 5 of investment in defence). Specifically, the probability that individual i is chosen to be the 6 parent of a particular offspring is P i where 7
In simulations where defence is continuous, we assume that offspring take their parent's 11 level of defence subject to a small perturbation drawn from a uniform distribution [-ε,ε] . If 12 defence is discrete, the offspring take their parent's level of defence with probability (1-µ), 13 the level one less with probability (µ/2) and the level one greater with probability (µ/2). In 14 both cases, we have a reflecting boundary at zero, to prevent negative values of defence. [0.5,1.5,2.5,…,9.5]. A similar pattern to that shown in Fig. 2a can be seen, with the two 32 defence levels (1.5 and 2.5) either side of the ESS value predicted by the continuous case 33 (~2.0) being most populous. Again, this is exactly as predicted by the analysis of the last 1 section, where (using the approximation of eqn. (22) we predict a mixture of 1.5 and 2.5 is 2 the ESS solution. In Figure 2c the allowable defence levels are now even more course 3 grained, being [0,4,8,….,24] , and the same trend is apparent with 0 and 4 being by far the 4 most populous levels, which again coincides with the theoretical results. 5 6 The analytic solution of the last selection suggests that the type of polymorphism displayed 7 in Figure 2c is not inevitable for discrete defences and monomorphism is possible. An 8 example of this is shown in Figure 2d , where only defence levels [0,0.1,0.2,…,1.0] are 9 allowed, all of which are below the ESS of the equivalent continuous model. As predicted, 10 the ESS for this case is for all individuals to adopt the highest defence level possible (1.0), 11 with a small number of individuals having values just below this, purely because of the 12 mutation mechanism generating small levels of heterogeneity. It is also possible to find 13 such a pure solution that is not one of the extreme solutions. Figure 2e In this section we relate the finding of our models to our three stated aims. We present a model of a continuously varying defence that is solved explicitly for 32 evolutionarily stable strategies. We are able to demonstrate analytically, that this simple 33 but quite general model always has a unique ESS, which is always pure. This strategy may 34 involve all members of the population adopting no defence, or all members of the 1 population making the same non-zero investment in defence. We are able to provide a 2 quantitative expression delineating these two regimes. Non-zero investment in defence is 3 more likely when predation pressure on the population is strong. Increases in predation 4 pressure can be seen to cause increases in the ESS in terms of level of defence. Our general 5 analytical solutions are obtained in the limiting case where predation pressure is not very 6 high, but our simulations demonstrate that the qualitative conclusions also hold when 7 predation pressure is very high. Further, the quantitative expression for the ESS level of 8 defence derived analytically for the limiting case of low predation pressure still provides a 9 good approximation when this condition does not pertain. Further, unlike previous studies we can definitively say that this behaviour is due to the 21 nature of the defensive trait. This assertion follows since our models that produce only pure 22
ESSs and those that produce mixed ones are identical in all respects other than in their 23 description of the levels that the defensive trait can take. Further still, we demonstrate that 24 a mixed ESS is not the inevitable outcome of a discretely expressed defence, since both our 25
analysis and simulation models demonstrate that the unique ESS can be either pure or 26 mixed. The pure ESS can have non-zero levels of defensive investment. 27 28 Further, for our simple but general model, we can make clear statements about the nature 29 of the mixed ESSs. Specifically that they have the following characteristics. 30 31 1. The mixed ESS can be a combination of no more than two defence levels. 32 2. The two levels in a mixed ESS must be nearest neighbour levels in an ordered list 33 of the levels that the defence can take. 34 1 This has important ramifications for judging the importance of mixed ESS explanations for 2 the prevalence of automimicry in the natural world. It suggests that mixed ESSs may be an 3 explanation where defence is discrete and where individuals can be divided into two 4 categories (for example with toxins either fully expressed or not expressed at all), and 5 where we are confident that no intermediate form of defence (partially expressed toxins) 6 could exist. If these criteria cannot be satisfied, then explanations for automimicry are 7 likely to lie in phenomena other than mixed ESSs. Such causes may obviously be external 8 to the prey such as variation in available foods that confer toxicity (e.g. Brower, Edmunds 9 & Moffitt, 1975; Brower et al., 1984) . Futhermore if sequestration and biosynthesis of 10 toxins is costly then variation in the resource richness of microhabitats within which prey 11 exists may cause intra-population variation in investment in chemical defence. In cases of 12 defensive sequestration, such as reflex bleeding in ladybirds (Holloway et al., 1991) the 13 defensive act often causes depletion of a defensive resource: again small-scale 14 geographical variation in terms of in predator threat could lead to variation in defence 15 within a breeding population. In addition causes of variation may have some internal 16 heritable component (see Eggenberger & Rowell-Rahier, 1992 ; see Muller et al., 2003) . given defence unambiguously into one of these two categories. 21 22 Another important conclusion from our work is that our models give substantially similar 23 solutions in the case where the defensive trait is continuous and in the case where the trait 24 is discrete but fine-grained (cf. Figs. 1 & 2a) . Although the discrete case may formally be a 25 mixed ESS, this ESS will involve only two levels and these levels will be nearest 26 neighbours in an ordered list of allowable levels. This, in turn, means that the mixed ESS 27 will be practically identical to a pure ESS if the discrete defence is fine grained. Further, 28
we demonstrate that the two levels of the mixed ESS in the discrete case, will straddle the 29 pure ESS level from the equivalent model with a continuous defence. Hence, the apparent 30 contradiction between existing models with continuous and discrete defences can in fact be 31 practically reconciled: whether a defence is continuous or discrete with a fine-grained 32 range of available levels makes no practical difference to the extent of variation in defence 33 that we should expect to measure across a population. Only when there is measurable 34 difference between nearest-neighbour levels of the discrete defence can we expect to find 1 mixed ESS behaviour that is practically different from a pure ESS. Whereas aposematism and mimicry are well-studied components of prey defences, the 7 evolutionary stability of constitutive secondary defences has received surprisingly little 8 attention. Though some authors separately suggest that pure (Leimar et al., 1986) and 9 mixed ESS states (Guilford, 1988 (Guilford, , 1994 for secondary defences may be evolutionarily 10 stable, there has been no general analytical demonstration of the conditions that define 11 these states. Yet the distinction between mixed and pure ESS states is important, especially 12 since some authors have argued that automimicry (in which some proportion of a 13 population are defended, whilst another proportion are undefended) may arise as a mixed 14 ESS state (Guilford, 1994) and subsequently others have carried out detailed chemical 15 analyses in order to see whether mixed ESS states for chemical defence can be observed in 16 nature (Holloway et al., 1991) . In fact Holloway et al. found that chemical defences in the 17 seven spot ladybird were (i) continuous in form and (ii) did not manifest automimicry. 18
19
We have shown that there is likely to be a single, pure ESS state when defences are 20 continuous in nature. A unique mixed ESS solution can occur when two defended forms 21 exist in a population and straddle the value for the notional pure ESS from the continuous 22 model, although it is also possible that one of these two forms will be the unique pure ESS. 23
When discretely varying defended forms do not straddle the pure ESS value, then a pure 24 solution is predicted, with the defensive form nearest to this pure value being 25 monomorphic. Furthermore, our capacity to detect mixed ESS states is limited by the 26 degree to which adjacent discontinuous defences are differentiated; as differentiation 27 between discreet states decreases, so phenotypic variation in defence caused by mixed ESS 28 states reduces. In natural systems our mixed ESS solution will converge on the pure state 29 as the difference between defended forms becomes too small to measure. 30 
